The Association of Strong Globalisation and Weakening State Power

Making a determination on the association and effect of strong globalisation and weakening state power relies, first, on establishing two important elements: theoretical definitions of globalisation and its practical or evidentiary existence and, in the latter, relevant criteria associated with its existence in these definitions and examples. The establishment of that criteria must be based on common factors that allow for a quantitative correlation of a state's power to globalisation, whether strong or weak. It is also important to note that the weakening of a nation-state does not only manifest in its economy, its structures and markets, but the cultural, ideological and social features that define the nation.

Where trade-offs almost always must occur when a state moves to 'globalised' trade model, the impacts of this will vary depending on what it determines is worth the sacrifice to participate in potentially lucrative global markets. Arguments over whether globalisation actually exists, vary widely. In the mid-to-late twentieth-century, views of globalisation were often formed and defined by being based on the result of economic integration and interdependence of national, regional and local economies with other nations - the reduction of the geographic barrier to trade. This was evidenced in the international exchange of saleable assets, as in goods, capital, services and knowledge, that were related to specific markets.

Now, globalisation is most generally defined as a process of intensification of worldwide social relations that would connect localities in a way that local events would influence events that were geographically distant (Giddens, 1990). In other examples and instances, globalisation is more specified and relates to actual conditions and processes that demonstrate control of economies and markets that are driven by the external global market environment, rather than internal state and government that govern domestic and international interactions. Whereas, internationalisation, the workings of a state's international system and its related processes, is distinctly different from globalisation mainly because it embodies and represents global interactions that *are* driven and controlled by government.

In Roy Jenkins (1998), "*The Chancellors*", he indicated how it financial officers of this period were accountable to government and responsible for collecting revenues on government expenditures, while minimising impact on the economy. Their scope of power, or responsibility, did not extend to the overarching state of the economy, nor did it include issues or concerns related to policy. Exemplified in capitalist economies, again going back to a Western-centric view, it wasn't until after the Second World War and born out of necessity, that governments considered that control over policy and economic growth and forecasting should be managed function.

By some, globalisation is observed as a liberating force that leads to economic flexibility, increased market presence or share and foundational wealth to the gross domestic product of countries through their economies and viable opportunities of prosperity for inhabitants(Sweeney, 2014). But others consider that view to be subjective and highly conditional - that globalisation can in fact be a threat - an antithesis - to building and maintaining competitive capabilities of less advantaged or weaker states, as well as a threat to cultures and sovereignty (Hirst and Thompson, 1995).

The presumed net effect on weaker state power in this concept is that as globalisation advances, the power of the state recedes due to a loss of control over the economy through its markets and the external momentum and demand of the global markets begin to drive the economic viability of the country. What results is a climate of reactive capitalisation to global market activity that cannot be harnessed or fostered long-term without substantial due diligence, risk mitigation and agile, flexible processes to sustain the endeavour.

Prior to technological advancements of the past century, but more so in the past few decades,, facilitating these trade exchanges required the capability to trade over large geographic areas. The existence of actual 'supply' and 'demand' markets for trade goods and nationally and internally supported economies were defining points for globalisation.

Although suggested that the 'globalised' economy emerged from this transformative period (Coleman and Chiasson, 2011) and established a new marketplace characterised by unregulated free trade, increased capital mobility and untethered physical and geographic boundaries, there are underlying complexities that validate the concept of globalisation. Two other common factors that were purported to define globalisation were lengthening chains of interdependency and structures of integration that continue to grow and scale (Mennell, 1990). But it is important to note that both of these characteristics are subjective to not only time periods, but the period of advancement (industrialisation, technology, etc.) in particular nations and their economies.

Often the term 'globalisation' is defined in the Western-centric construct that ignores the subjective reality; not all nations enjoy, nor are destined to evolve into, economic integration by sourcing of goods and services from around the world. This stands to reason that, it is irrefutable that a nation requires a particular level of infrastructure, investment, maturity and risk mitigation to recognise globalisation as a valid state of economic trade. Therefore, globalisation may never be realised by all nations, or even as an extension or manifestation of internationalisation elaborated by technological advancement, but globalisation may be applied on a widespread scale, to the extent that the resulting free markets and their impacts may heavily influence nation-states, weakening or otherwise.

The emergence of globalised trade can occur and exist, as evidenced in fair trade and socially responsible manufacturers and suppliers, without necessarily transforming, homogenising and/or absorbing the cultural, ideological and societal norms (capitalism, liberalism, etc.) and aspects that sustain nation-states. Kleinknecht (1997) had made interesting observations around the 'myth of globalisation' and the assessment that there is a determination of a phenomenon based on characteristics of demonstrated processes that define what Mennell, in his interpretation of Elias' theory, described as 'natural' for humans in their drive to survive. In short, it was put forth that humans are driven, in part, by cultural not biological adaptation as evidenced in the processes of ever-widening survival units.

Whereas, Albrow (2007) focused on globalisation as a period of time where the 'modern' age met the 'global' age and was characterised by a broader homogenisation of language, shared currencies, balanced trade processes and higher adoption of capitalist and democratic fundamentals in a liberalist climate. Fulcher, in *The Globalisation and the Nation State and Global Society* (2000), defined globalisation as "the development of relatively distance-less relationships that extend beyond national units and involve a growing consciousness of the world as a whole". While massive changes and efficiencies brought about by travel, communications, etc. aide globalisation, it was technology provided momentum to create and maintain global markets.

While these modes did facilitate and expedite traditional trade processes and likely modernised them and enabled higher competitiveness in existing markets, they did not homogenise processes to a common, global activity outside legislative controls. Similarly, Day and Thompson (2004) suggested that globalisation could constitute the intensification of connections between different locales in different parts of the world and thereby increase of consciousness of this development, so globalisation, although considered a modern ideology, should not necessarily be placed only in present day. The salient characteristics of globalisation are crucial to contextualise and validate its application, starting with historical trade events of significance, such as explorations of Colombus and Vasco da Gama in the 1400s. Therefore, it may effective to view internationalisation and early globalisation in the Modern Era as subjective to that era's advancements, and the maturation of globalisation in the Post-Modern Era. Thusly, in current day or the Post-Post-Modern Era, the dependence on technology has transformed globalisation.

The above modes enhanced internationalism and made more it formidable through technological connectedness, travel and communications, which played a fundamental role in the transactional innovations of trade. Technology removed geographic boundaries by permitting exchanges, irrespective of traditional process, cultural and legislative constraints that hemmed in formal commercial trade systems, as seen in internationalisation. However, assessment of the current day definition of globalization is limited; it was only decades ago that substantial change was seen in free-markets and free-trade, beyond the intensification of physical movement and cross-border exchange of saleable assets. Making this more complex, technology is both a key part of distribution models and supply chains that deliver saleable assets and a saleable asset. For example, Alibaba, the defunct Silk Road and eBay technologies provide access to goods and services but also creates competitive sub-sets of services within the global marketplace.

Clearly, transcending geographical boundaries is a key nuance in globalisation and, regardless of whether a state is weak or strong, it must also must have and maintain a competitive edge for a product or service market, which can include acquisition and resale from a weaker state, and meet conditions and criteria to launch into global markets.

Defining Globalisation and Identifying Characteristics

For the purposes of this paper, it is accepted that globalisation cannot exist without competitive product or service offering and technological advancement. While internationalisation drove market breadth outside geographical boundaries of nations, the enhancement of chains of interdependency and structures of integration that encouraged globalised economic trade, supported unhindered transactional channels and allowed homogenisation of trade and exchange, could only be achieved by globalisation.

Therefore, the utilized definition of globalisation is demonstrated as actual conditions and processes, as described above, that maximize economies by engaging in markets that are driven by an external global environment without geographic constraints.

First, this recognizes that the global economy is fluid, developing and evolving from the convergence of a number of uncontrolled economic and trade factors, such as supply, demand and the feasibility of access to those markets and infrastructure to permit the exchange of those goods or services. Secondly, it accepts the notional argument that globalisation is a concept rather than an evolutionary state that would be expected of progressive and/or progressing nations, subject to a particular era. Considering the various factors of internal state and government, validation of globalisation would be evidenced in successful globalised trade interactions marked by a positive impact on state economies and the ability and probability of maintaining economic viability and balanced state power.

In determining the weakening of a state's power, this is directly attributed to its lack of, or ineffectiveness, of a strategic geo-political policy that intends on containing and preserving its specified assets, thereby protecting them from the external influence of a stronger state. The fundamental purpose of this geo-political strategy is maintain the status quo of a state, or to engage pursuant to a policy détente, to avoid weakening or forced change and rollback, as in de-civilisation, of state's particular processes or features.Whether weaker or less advantaged nations can enter and compete and maintain position without losing power in a globalised economy hinges on access to technological capabilities and infrastructures, including strategic policy, flexible political regimes and multinationals, and the electronic transmission, conversion and exchange of currencies and funds.

Where strong states are typically able to meet the costs and demands of globalisation and can counter loss, that weaker states cannot. noting that infrastructure requires continued investment, depreciates and is subject to obsolescence. While other efforts, such as competitive workforce costs and labour wages, may offset these transitional and operating costs, these can be challenged by corporate, social and ethical responsibility, costs of fast and ever-changing technology and the inherent volatility of global markets, thereby reversing these offsets and resulting in irretrievable losses. In large part, these it is these factors that hinder or prohibit entry and participation of weaker states in global markets, and should they be successful they may not have the resources and conditions needed to maintain and sustain participation and to mitigate, transfer or avoid market risks.

As well, the absence of the non-state actors, particularly multinationals, is a very significant barrier to weaker states entering and participating in global markets, as they represent an extremely powerful and resilient economic factor for a nation (Risse-Kappan, 1995). A multi-faceted role, multinationals protect against the volatility of global markets, which are in essence defined as speculative, and can avert significant damage to an economy, especially where large percentages of the economy are vested in their success. Mitigating losses through flexible political and government regimes and agile taxation and economic activities add to the level of advancement and adaptability. The recurring rhetoric in Western Nations is the promotion of the dominant neo-classical view of globalisation as economic liberalism; interpreted as 'markets are the most efficient way of running the economy and that any restraints on economic activity are rejected, unless based on exceptional and temporary conditions'.

Finally, a key response to entering the global marketplace by weaker states lies in the ability, or decision, to lessen particular controls that may related to ideologies, legislation, economic structures, political positions and societal features that may be rooted in long-standing values. Rubens Ricupero (2008) considered that the reduction of controls is the result of the "profound economic or technological forces that are more or less independent of the will of governments" and that "these forces continue [to be] active and operating". To the opposite, very much in line with Fulcher's views, the interrelationships between the supply and acquisition nations may become its downfall, where social responsibility and ideologies may conflict with each other, making trade difficult.

Weakening States and Westernisation

Even with globalisation in Western Nations becoming commonplace, this does not indicate a shared ethnic, cultural or value-based association with the trading nations. But can be destroy these interrelationship: if there is a deep disparity between values or social responsibility this can upend trade relationships, as seen with labour and human rights concerns with "blood diamonds", fair trade coffee and chocolate and clothing manufacturers. But whether globalisation stands to Westernise a nation is dependent on many factors. Thompson stated *"Theorizing Nationalism"* (2004), as stating that ‘globalisation is the enforced installation, worldwide of one particular, privileged, historical experience’, thus arguing that although globalisation exists as a model, and what is being experienced is Westernisation. This appears to be invalid in numerous examples where nations may adopt the features of Westernisation in their economic policies and structures, but maintain their social and political positions. Overall, the impact of globalisation on the weakening, or decline, of state power can be presupposed by what history says of the opposite: the rise of state power through constructed empires serve to extend and strengthen it. However, even where the development of the globalised and political processes reinforced the state through international organisation, this is not a static nor an evolutionary trajectory of these processes.

Although some of the aforementioned theories would suggest that globalisation is and will continue to transcend national units, the continued importance of national institutions, international relationships and especially regional organisations, will persist, even if multi-level trade manifests in globalised activities. There are many theoretical arguments as to why a 'globalist utopia' may already be occurring or why it will never happen. Albrow (2007) argues that the nation-states were already in decline and this is the final push towards globalisation, instead of nations becoming regulators in this global arena. Irrespective of this view, the globalisation cannot occur without specific conditions and without meeting criteria that permits the entry and sustained participation by a state; the decline of a state hinges on its overall viability and not state power.

A key argument in the decline of any nation-state in the globalised economy is the insufficiency of vested authority to manage regulatory demands in the global economy. Evidenced in the Asian financial crisis and the US mortgage crisis, there was a clear indication of a lack of financial and banking regulations to protect and sustain foreign investment and meet not only demands of integrated nations but of the processes themselves. In these cases, the crises have receded but the higher entities surviving with the agility and ability to adopt the required institutional change.

So although theoretically valid, it is difficult to found an argument that globalisation could or would on its own over-throw the overarching role and inherent identity of a nation and its people. Weaker states have strategically addressed these requirements and in other cases stronger states have failed to acquire and maintain global market space in particular sectors. Using a narrative that resembles a high-level SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) matrix, comparatives are presented to demonstrate weak states failing where other weak states succeed under the same economic and financial conditions, weak states prevailing where strong cannot and strong states battling other strong states over protracted periods, neither reaching an end point. The following examples show the impacts of globalisation in three case views: 1) telecommunications service provider industry as a global market in Canada and US, 2) future US and China global economies and relations, and 3) Ireland's and Greece's economies.

Globalised Telecommunications Service Provider Industry in Canada and US

The key factor to globalisation for telecommunication companies in the past decades has been substantial and widespread policy and regulatory change that has affected the deployment of service and infrastructure. The Telecoms Agreement in the World Trade Organization reflected the desire for many countries domestically liberalise their services by making international service commitments. In the early 1990s the cost of cellular phones services and rigid domestic regulation for foreign investors became a barrier to foreign investment and deregulation was the regulatory control that needed loosening to change this competitive climate and expanse of international markets.

For two strong states, Canada and the US, as compared to Europe, had maintained domestic policy autonomy that was incongruent to unregulated and free moving global capital markets. Between telecommunications companies in Canada and the United States, Canadian domestic regulation was being undermined by companies who were able to purchase blocks of calling capacity from US phone services providers, creating a new globalised market that in turn, and time, loosened regulatory authority of the domestic regulators. Likewise, global policy transformation occurred for the European telecommunications industry due to service providers buying bulk capacity abroad and then resell foreign calls into domestic markets at very lower rates, driving down domestic rates.

In these cases, which were respectively international, arbitrage reduced the ability of nation-states to regulate and therefore weakened national regulatory structures resulting in the weakening of state authority. Canada adjusted to legislative and stringent policy roadblocks by rolling back theirs market focus from global to domestic, a micro-market as such, and was able to mitigate its losses due to its prior investment and existing infrastructure, skilled workforce, established multinationals and Crown corporations and market dominance through parallel domestic services.

Under what conditions would Canada have suffered weakened state power, if it had not adjusted to a global climate in telecommunications that was insupportable to its position, is difficult to project. A substantial amount of the required criteria to enter the global telecommunications market existed in Canada and short of utterly ignoring the fundamental risk, while competing against a more agile super-power, entire state failure would have been unlikely. But the telecom price wars in the US and a weakening Canadian economy due to declining oil prices, has brought forward further aggressive price cutting to gain market share and the entry of cable companies into wireless will only add to competitiveness (WorldBank data sets).

On the opposite end of the success of global telecommunications, while still struggling in the current climate, the UK and Italy are maximizing and monetizing new global market space through data, 4G and convergence, as concentrated lines of business. These two nations are able to invest and specialize without the regulatory, policy and controls that have excluded other nations, albeit stronger powers, from maintaining a competitive position in this globalised sector. However, on to the opposite, should regulatory and policy controls tighten in Europe, this could have a serious and adverse effect on these smaller nations who are well-vested in the market sector, if they are not prepared to respond to a changing legislative landscape.

Future US and China Global Economies and Relations

The US and China have had a long history of economic advancements and commercial battles over new and maturing competitive markets. The US has been a steadily growing capitalist super-power that is well-diversified in many markets and sectors. After numerous national events, such as 9/11, mortgage crisis and mounting debt, US growth has slowed substantially and is refocused with the current administration re-investing in its exports, domestic manufacturing and trade treaties to maximize returns - this a reminder that state power is not isolated to globalised activities and success in those markets.

In 2015, China was the fastest-growing major economy in the world, averaging 10% growth since the 1980s. China's turning point to a trending capitalist economy from hard-line socialist, occurred in 1978 with market reforms and loosening of policy and controls that shifted it from a centrally-planned economy to one that is market-based, namely in technology and commodities (WorldBank data sets). In part due to its entrenched cultural values, authoritarianism and communist roots, China is still classified as a developing country, with its per capita income a fraction of advanced countries, but as the second largest economy in the world it stands to overtake the US in this century.

Both the US and China have well established and skilled workforces, infrastructure, solid domestic and foreign trade policies and treaties, but being a leader in globalised markets and being a super-power are two distinctly different pursuits, independent of the other. The determining factor for China will rest in its ability to maintain its current markets and its growth rate, while implementing a geo-political containment strategy to maintain its status quo and cultural values. The US will have to decide between dominating markets by loosening policy and controls or to resurrect as a super-power, in either case the US will have to focus on a policy détente not only with China but also Russia, to avoid weakening through forced change or rollback of civilised processes or features.

With China's expected continued growth and its dominance over several markets, especially in assembly and supply chain, globalisation could advance China stands as the US' primary threat and may well pass the US in terms of growth, market position, share and control, as well as future agility and resilience as a dominant global trading power. While China has transformed the nature of national and political policy - in a dichotomy of cultural preservation and capitalist growth - to liberalise the Chinese economy, concerns have been raised as to, if China's economic power were to rise to domination of global markets, whether the existing international order would be accepted or challenged.

Ireland's Technology Industry and Greece's Post-Austerity Slump

Ireland has experienced an interesting surge, decline and resurgence over the past few decades, particularly in the technology industry. Somewhat of an anomaly, Ireland has made a comeback for a lull and where once known as the Celtic Tiger in the 1990s. Long after the Second World War and the old agrarian, anti-materialist, Gaelic-speaking ideals for the nation had fell aside, but its cultural identity and nationalism remained strong. Eventually, Ireland's population and limited national resources were dwindling leaving its economic position stagnant with tourism and export and trade, such as cattle, poultry and eggs and canned meat as subsidiaries, as mainstays.

Several years after the bursting of the Dublin boom in 2008, by 2011 the GDP had shrunk by 14 per cent, unemployment had risen to 14 per cent, tax revenues fell inward and banking industry experienced a crisis requiring a €67 billion austerity bailout from the EU, IMF and UK. Growth quickly returned as international investment had never waned and widespread public support for the existing and new policies, including high levels of education and low corporate taxation, remain. With significant policy change bringing an increase in foreign investment, such as Dell, Intel, Microsoft, Apple, HP, Pfizer and Google, from 1995 and 2000 grew Ireland's prosperity at an average rate of 9.4 per cent slowing to an average of 5.9 per cent between 2000 and 2008 (World bank data sets).

More recently, the economy of the Republic of Ireland grew at the astonishing rate of almost seven per cent in 2015. Part of the lure to the multinationals who have set up European headquarters in Ireland is the corporate tax at a rate of 12.5 per cent, compared to 20 per cent in the United Kingdom and a European Union average of 22 per cent and single point access to the EU and global markets (OECD Observer). Similar conditions had existed for Greece and Northern Ireland but the results were the polar opposite;

Northern Ireland's economic recovery has been one of the slowest and weakest on record with a sub-one per cent growth in seven of the last eight years; part of this unexpected outcome was due to less than strategic policy and lack of investment in infrastructure and limited value chains, resulting in an unpreparedness to weather tumultuous global markets and aggressive nations seeking market dominance. Due to the refinement of policy and infrastructures, the Republic of Ireland has been able to extend its globalisation in other industries, such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices and financial services, on the processes that were developed to support the technology industry. These processes succeeded and were proven to support the foreign and local multinationals and their complex value chains and rapid innovation in these same industries to benefit their local firms entrenched in these clusters.

With Greece, it has struggled, even after austerity, and was borrowing to repay debts with its revenues barely covering the cost of running the country. While an improvement from where Greece's financial collapse began, there is a clear notion that there is a lack of international confidence in not only Greece's economic and international policies, but in the processes that underpin them and the government charged with it administration. Largely stuck in a failing state of pseudo-internationalisation, Greece has yet to enter the arena of globalisation and will not, until its regulatory controls and competitive factors improve. With a remarkably low percentage of export and GDP, Greece remains in risk for trade relationships and its listing financial state remains an enormous concern for international investors from the fiscal perspective down to sustaining critical infrastructure, domestic revenues and demonstrating a stable government and healthy international relationships (WorldBank data sets).

Investment in a nation in this situation would be would be tantamount to investing capital on equities that are acquired and managed by a bank on the verge of collapse; this alone precludes it from success as an internationalised nation. Of similar reputation, Northern Ireland is experiencing a waning confidence rooted in civil order and political stability derived from another source: high politicisation and dependency on the public sector. More dependent on the public sector and central government spending than any other part of the UK, Northern Ireland's public sector accounts for about 70 per cent of the region's gross domestic product and nearly 30 per cent of its workforce is employed in the public sector compared with 18 per cent in the UK as a whole. Its rate of gross domestic product growth also lags behind the UK and struggles with chronically high unemployment (WorldBank data sets).

Northern Ireland's austerity focused on streamlining the public sector and reducing redundancy, which is in direct alignment with the nation's areas of inflation (Kirby, 2002). Regardless, the next stage for Northern Ireland will have little choice but to fund its policies from steadily decreasing resources and utilise internal and domestic resource to re-stabilise the nation in order to increase it viability as a global contender and while other remedies, such as a united Ireland, crop up periodically, it is unlikely the current political regime will be able to package this positively, for the public and foreign investors.

Does Strong Globalisation Result In Weakened States?

Based on the definition of globalisation and its qualifying criteria stated in this paper, globalisation can weaken even the strongest state power, if the required constraints are not in place and maintained; in other words, in some cases, globalization is not the direct cause but poor management of entering and competing in global markets or in the state protection from stronger states as they enter and compete in these global markets. Though it is accepted that successful globalised trade interactions are marked by a positive impact on state economies and the ability and probability of the nation to maintain economic viability and balanced state power, not all states may be capable of capitalising on globalisation. Whether globalisation is necessary for the future of weaker states can be debated, as there are a number of market arenas that can be capitalised based on lower costs to market and higher profit margins. Therefore, determining the feasibility of alternate market entry or creation, such as regional, national or micro-/niche market control and share, must be assessed on the redeeming competitive features of the product or service and the similar criteria to that of globalisation must exist to deliver to these markets.

Considering globalisation in particular, where strong states are typically able to meet the costs and demands of globalisation and can counter loss, the weaker states must not only have the above factors in place, scale to the market control they are pursuing, but they must also be able to meet the requirements for continued investment and advancements. Also crucial are containment and control factors that maintain the status quo of a state and allow for adaptability and advancement, such as strategic geo-political policy, flexible political regimes, agile economic activities, and to prevent weakening through forced change and rollback, as in de-civilisation of particular processes or features. As well, infrastructures and technological capabilities allowing for electronic transmission, conversion and exchange of currencies and funds, competitive workforce costs and labour wages and even powerful non-state entities, such as multinationals, must be present and mature.

In a world still formed by nation-states that are characterised by centralised power, the lower level entities have often receded with the higher level entities increasing in authority over decades and centuries. Weakened policy autonomy, such as domestic and foreign economic policy, (Schulze and Urspring, 1998), new transnational arbitrage opportunities and social insurance programs may be unsustainable or inevitably out of reach for lower entities. Robert Gilpin (1987) suggested that "hegemonic stability" remains valid. If globalisation enables nation authorities to manage new transnational problems inherent to growing trade, foreign investment, market interdependencies and advancing technologies in the global marketplace, one would assume weaker states are not be able to acquire the jurisdictional powers needed to sustain competition in the global trade arena.

However, several weaker states have combated this, such as Ireland's technology industry and India's technology, knowledge worker and call centre outsource industry, where stronger states have failed to acquire and maintain global market space and sustained significant loss, such as the US and Canada. Within this narrative of what is a conceptual SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) matrix, comparative assumptions can be anecdotally evidenced - weak states failing where other weak states succeed under the same economic and financial conditions, weak states prevailing where strong cannot due to workforce and wage agility and strong states battling other strong states over protracted periods, neither reaching an end point. Hegemony does not appear to guarantee success in globalisation; the social, cultural, ideological, or economic influence exerted by a dominant group can help, but may also hinder strong entities as they enter and operate in these markets.

The complexity of trade relationships and stringent regulations may be a slowing factor to markets, where weaker entities experience higher mobility and economic strength and viability due to their ability to remain agile and respond to a changing global market climate. While some weaker states will not have the required foundational factors to enter and participate in particular markets, it is clear that state power through constructed empires may have served to extend and strengthen states in the past, but this may no longer be a valid supposition. With that, the future holds interesting scenarios with respect to globalisation to observe and analyse, such as results of US trade treaty modifications, advancements and growth with China's economy and sector specific changes related to regulation and de-regulation, especially telecommunications, and the responses and impacts of affected nations.

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